Study and mapping of the Egyptian diaspora in Germany

Around the world, societies are changing and individuals are on the move: around 250 million people currently live outside their country of origin. This evolving situation presents opportunities for all concerned: diversity and exchange across national borders provide impetus for economic, political and social progress – both in host countries and in countries of origin.

Migrants themselves play an important role in building bridges between countries. Through their expertise, ideas, experience and contacts, they stimulate sustainable change. In a variety of ways, they help their countries of origin to remain competitive, while simultaneously shaping society in their host countries. This interaction offers great potential for development. On behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), we support the activities of migrants from emerging and developing countries and advise our partner countries on how to use migration to advance sustainable development.

The Migration for Development programme focuses on four areas of activity:

- Knowledge transfer through returning experts
- Cooperation with diaspora organisations
- Migrants as entrepreneurs
- Migration policy advice

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Content

Introduction

The present study outlines the history and current situation of the Egyptian diaspora in Germany with special consideration of social and cultural organisations. In the period between February and August 2015, qualitative methods were applied in an attempt to examine what effects the transformations that have taken place in the country of origin since 2011 have had on Egyptian associations and groupings in Germany. The focus was on intergenerational and socio-cultural dynamics that shape the current situation of the diaspora groupings. This sheds light on more recent transnational network forms in particular, which give the previous 'landscape' of associations new impetus because they predominantly involve circular exchange between actors from Egypt and actors from the various migrant generations in Germany. The study was conducted on behalf of the 'Migration for Development' programme of Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, so that a special focus was on whether and what connections to development cooperation in today's Egypt are established through the various types of organisations. It asks the following question: To what extent can we identify potential for and new approaches to development cooperation through diaspora actors?

The study is structured as follows: Part I presents a more general view of the Egyptian diaspora's formation in Germany and its demographic situation. Part II provides socio-cultural mapping that characterises five different forms of organisation and illustrates them using selected examples. Part III formulates specific recommendations on how GIZ can make use of the particular networks among Egyptians in Germany for the 'Migration for Development' programme.

Methodology

This study is the result of five months of research which should be characterised as more exploratory than explanatory given the limited amount of time and resources available. In order to reasonably capture the current situation of the Egyptian population in Germany, the author researched international and national sources and drew on the available data from the German Federal Statistical Office and the German Federal Employment Agency relating to Egyptians living in Germany (see Part I).

The focus of the study was on ethnographic interviews because establishing contacts and conducting a total of 29 interviews[1] also consistently made it possible to obtain and update further information on associations and networks. The contact data on Egyptian and German-Egyptian associations already available from GIZ and CIM (Centre for International Migration, a working group of GIZ and the International Placement Services office (ZAV) of the Federal Employment Agency) formed the starting point for directing the enquiry to the declared contacts (typically the presidents of the associations). The project was briefly presented in an email with relevant attachments from GIZ and CIM and the offer of a telephone conversation or personal interview. This first email was sent to 26 recipients, eight of whom responded directly by email or return phone call. At the same time, the relevant Internet pages were researched and checked for currency, providing a rough impression of the actual activities being conducted by the associations.

Personal contacts and networks of the researcher[2] and her student assistants[3] were also used in order to find interview partners and obtain access to hitherto not listed organisations.

Even if they mostly involved *representatives* of the relevant organisation, for the methodology it must be kept in mind that individual conversations with the researcher also provide a stage for self-portrayal, enabling the narrator to introduce into the narrative, reflect on and evaluate biographical elements through the association's history or activities. Association board members are often highly committed individuals who in addition to their association work are also active in other areas of civil society such as local politics, and who receive recognition for this in their social environment, for example by being repeatedly elected chairperson of the board. Thus the study had the secondary effect of revealing how many individuals with a migrant background actively contribute to the civil society forums of the German migrant community, often for long periods of their biographies. The content-focused evaluation hardly does justice to these dimensions of the captured data. Consequently, it is important to point out that interviews in migrant associations are also very revealing of individual integration strategies undertaken within the migrant community. However, it is also important to bear in mind the limited nature of these data because they represent *descriptions* of practices and events within the associations that could not be validated or supplemented by long-term participatory observation nor by short-term situation analyses.

In addition to the direct interviews, three online discussion forums were selected by Egyptians in Germany ('German Egyptian Organization', 'Egyptian German Network for Changing Egypt', and 'Mayadin El Tahrir') in order to summarise the topics of these forums within the timeframe of the study and follow them up for recurring or controversial debates. The dialogue and discursive texts from the Internet and the analysis of their content effectively complement the core data corpus compiled with the interviews. This blog analysis is included in both Parts I and II of the study.

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1   The author would like to express her heartfelt thanks to all participants who contributed to this study with their interviews and information.

2   The existing contacts with Coptic-Orthodox communities in German-speaking regions stemming from the author's previous research (Weißköppel 2011, 2013) were deliberately ignored in order to enable access to a wide range of groupings of diverse sectarian denominations of the Egyptian diaspora. The study thus omits a focus on all forms of Christian-Orthodox communities and associations that would have to be integrated in the context of comprehensive research on religious networks within the Egyptian diaspora in Germany (see Part III: Recommendations).

3   The author would like to expressly thank the student assistants for their hard work without naming them individually in order to protect their networks.

List of acronyms

BAMF .... Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees)

BBMFI .... Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration
(German Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration)

CIM .... Centre for International Migration and Development

DAAD .... Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (German Academic Exchange Service)

GIZ .... Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH

IOM .... International Organization for Migration

MENA .... Middle East and North Africa

MfD .... Migration for Development

ZAV .... Zentrale Auslands- und Fachvermittlung (International Placement Services)

Part I
Worldwide Egyptian diaspora with focus on Germany

I. The concept of diaspora

The concept of diaspora describes the multi-local dispersion of individual societies or ethnic or religious groups in order to map people's displacement or emigration processes. These 'systems' or 'cultures of migration' (Hahn/ Klute 2007) can stretch across the globe and typically take long periods of time to develop. The academic literature usually refers to diaspora cultures when the homeland culture has been consciously handed down and perpetuated for at least three generations (Cohen 1997, Weißköppel 2005, 2008), so that it is also verified to have formed institutions at the new locations. Interestingly, specific diasporas develop their own or new geographic 'landscapes' (see 'ethnoscapes', Appadurai 1991). This is because they choose specific destination countries more often than others and particular societies share a more intensive common migration history, lie in closer geographic proximity to each other or are more closely integrated politically and economically than others, which encourages specific migration routes (Glick-Schiller et al. 1994). In addition, the individual locations of migrants are interconnected by the mobility of networks of e.g. relatives or specific professional groups, thus forming a prototypical triadic mesh of interaction between the country of origin and the various countries of residence (Cohen 1997, Schwalgin 2004:244, Weißköppel 2010:51). Although the various criteria for defining the concept of diaspora cannot be discussed critically here (see Werbner 2002, Spellman 2004, Brubaker 2005, Weißköppel 2010:53), this study follows the descriptive working concept of GIZ, primarily with the aim of illuminating the sphere of relationships and interaction that has emerged through Egyptian emigration to Germany. Even if this places a selective focus on 'the Egyptian diaspora in Germany' that will have to omit the contexts of the complex interconnection between Egyptians dispersed around the globe, some introductory remarks on the emergence of global diaspora will follow.

I.1 Egyptian diaspora formation around the world

According to Zohry/ Debnath (2010: 19, 21), almost three million Egyptians (2,736,729 to be precise) were documented as emigrants in the year 2001 (see also CAPMAS 2001 and Fargues 2005:21). It can be assumed that this figure has increased further over the past 15 years, along with unreported numbers not captured by the various statistics. Fargues (2005a) reflects on the various survey motives of the countries involved in the migration process in an exemplary manner and illustrates that the statistical registration of Egyptian immigrants in selected host countries is usually far more differentiated than the documented numbers of Egyptians who have emigrated, which tend to be more like rough estimates. These latter figures therefore are much higher than the sum of the specific numbers of immigrants in European host countries, for example. A more recent figure can be found in the report of the Migration Policy Centre (2013:1) of the European University Institute in Florence, according to which some six and a half million Egyptians were registered as emigrants in the year 2009[4]; similar numbers can be found in Moursi (2012:44-45), a report of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which indicates that many authors refer to the same secure sources and a regular update is lacking, for instance by the Egyptian authorities. After the upheavals in 2011, however, one could sense on the ground in Egypt how the will to emigrate increased among the population and how various ways to leave the country were being sought as the visa requirements for foreign travel were being tightened. Nevertheless, the most recent migration movements also follow the familiar routes that established themselves in the 20th and 21st centuries: primarily to the neighbouring countries of Egypt in the MENA region[5] (mainly Saudi Arabia, formerly Libya, Lebanon, Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait) and to 'Western'[6] welfare states ranging

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4   Egyptian Copts alone (generic term for Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant Christians), who make up around 10% of Egypt's total population, estimate that more than one million today live in the worldwide diaspora, primarily in the USA, Canada, Australia and Western Europe.

5   Common acronym for 'Middle East and North Africa', see Glossary.

6   It is known that this term is not used geographically, but rather to characterise modern welfare states, which are primarily though not exclusively situated in the northern hemisphere.

from the USA and Canada to Europe (mainly Italy, England, France, see Table 1)[7] and even Australia (Fargues 2005a:21; Zohry/Debnath 2010:17-19).

Destination country in Europe	Data collection by host countries in the period 1998–2002
Italy	40,879
England	24,705
France	15,974
Germany	14,477
Netherlands	10,982
Greece	7,448
Austria	4,721
Switzerland	1,369
TOTAL	120,555

The literature contains little about migration routes through Sub-Saharan Africa or Asia (Fargues 2005a:21, Baraulina et al. 2006), even though these options are also chosen, but with no demographic impact.

While migration through the Gulf region and adjoining states such as Libya and Saudi Arabia is characterised primarily by temporary and circular labour migration, emigration to Western countries follows a mixed range of motives that include religious and political persecution, personal and professional development and further training, academic careers and various forms of labour and marriage migration (Zohry/ Debnath 2010). This diversity of motives has hardly changed even after the political upheaval in Egypt since 2011 (i.a. West 2011). What can be observed instead is that the ongoing transformation (Setter et al. 2009, Rosiny 2012, Kandil 2012, El Masry 2013, Castellino/ Cavanaugh 2014) has generated uncertainty, which intensifies the decision-making processes in favour of emigration.

The predominant pattern of linear migration from the country of origin to a targeted host country, which migration research assumed to be widespread in the 20th century, has been replaced in the 21st century by the finding that more complex forms of transnational, circular or multi-local step-by-step migration often coexist (i.a. Glick-Schiller et al. 1994, Pries 2008). Nonetheless, statistical records assume that migrants have the centre of their life in a more or less consciously chosen host nation in which legal and political membership(s) are regulated in the framework of citizenship or immigration and asylum laws of the country of residence. Statistical sources thus necessarily reflect a methodological nationalism, even though this has been criticised from the perspective of transnational theorists (Wimmer/ Glick-Schiller 2002), as it ignores relevant spaces of action in the 'space between' migrants' countries of origin and new host countries. However, the statistics from a national perspective must be viewed critically as well because, depending on the interests of the observers, that is, from the perspective of the society of origin or the host society, they apply different criteria and classifications (Fargues 2005 a+b).[8] In the following outline of the demographic and socio-structural situation of Egyptians *in Germany,* it must be taken into account that only official forms of registration within the range of possible residence titles of Germany's immigration legislation[9] are represented and data on social stratification were selected according to age, gender and civil status only.

## I.II Egyptian population in Germany

I.II.I Demographic and socio-economic dimensions

The diaspora landscape which Egyptians have created in Germany in the course of the 20th and 21st centuries reflects key strategies of emigration from Egyptian society: ways out of economic and political crises, educational and status mobility, labour and marriage migration, and escape from religious and political discrimination.

Depending on their motive for emigration, people take specific 'paths of immigration' (according to Glick-Schiller et al. 2006) which usually enable long-term residence as well as, in the

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
broadest sense, integration into German society. Egyptians in Germany have residence statuses in the context of education or employment contracts, as part of marriage or family reunification, in the case of successful asylum applications through what is referred to as a 'residence permission', or in the form of a 'tolerated' status when the application for asylum has been denied but a deportation ban is in place for other relevant reasons. As almost all the aforementioned residence statuses in Germany are temporary or can be extended or made indefinite according to specific criteria, Egyptians with temporary residence permits are statistically in the majority (see Table 3 and Illustration 3).

EGYPTIAN CITIZENS IN SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1971–2014									
Country of residence	1971	1981	1991	2000	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Italy	…	…	…	30,582*	58,587	62,400	66,932	76,691	…
Germany	5,349	8,587	8,640	13,811	12,2787	12,711	13,870	17,346	19,786
Austria	781	1,574	4,509	…	…	4,925	5,091	5,226	…
Netherlands	…	…	4,546	2,771	2,575	2,603	2,550	2,465	…

Table 2: Data extract from German Federal Statistical Office (2015a).

EGYPTIAN POPULATION BY RESIDENCE STATUS IN THE YEAR 2014				
Residence status under new 2004 legislation	Male Egyptians	Female Egyptians	Total	In per cent
Permanent (settlement permit)	2,772	903	4,131 = 3,675 + 465*	20.9
… with EU Freedom of Movement Certificate	297	98	395	2.0
Temporary, total	5,432	3,611	9,290 = 9,043 + 247**	46.9
› of which: … for education and training	1,503	554	2,057	10.4
… for employment	1,068	142	1,210	6.1
… reasons of intern. law, humanitarian, political reasons	294	208	502	2.5
… family reasons	2,363	2,650	5,013	25.3
… special residence rights	204	57	261	1.3
under the Asylum Procedure Act, of which 'tolerated'	491	117	608	3.0
under the Asylum Procedure Act, of which 'residence permission'	1,963	654	2,617	13.2
without title/not tolerated/no permission	1,175	531	1,706	8.6
Other cases	692	347	1,039	5.3
Exempted from residence title requirement, homeless foreigner	5	4	9	0.1
Filed application for residence title	687	343	1,030	5.2
+ Residence title under old legislation 1990				
*Permanent	360	96	456*	s. line 1 above
**TEMPORARY	174	73	247**	s. line 3 above
TOTAL	13,356	6,430	19,786	= 100 %

Table 3: Data extract from German Federal Statistical Office 2015b.

EGYPTIAN POPULATION IN GERMANY: CONTINUITIES IN ITS SOCIAL STRUCTURE		
	2011 (2009)	2015 (2014)
Total Egypt. population	11,923	19,786
Average age	33.1 years	31.5 years
Gender distribution M:F	2/3 : 1/3	2/3 : 1/3
Marital status: married	Approx. 50 %	44.1 %
Births in Germany	8 %	6.2 %
Length of stay	9.2 years	7.1 years

Illustration 1, based on data from the German Federal Statistical Office (2015c).

Illustration 2, based on data from the German Federal Statistical Office (2015 a).

Illustration 3 based on Table 3.

On the basis of the statistical data on the Egyptian population in Germany presented in the CIM study (2011, see also Baraulina et al. 2006), after reviewing the current data of the German Federal Statistical Office (2015 a,b,c) and the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF 2015, 2014), it is clear that the Egyptian population has increased significantly. In 2014, a total of 19,786 Egyptians were registered in Germany, 8,000 more than in 2009 (CIM 2011).

A glance at the differentiated structural data, such as gender, average age, marital status and average length of stay, however, shows continuity rather than change in the Egyptian population (see Illustration 1). The ratio of women to men remains unchanged at one third to two thirds, on average Egyptian migrants are aged in their early 30s and 44% are married, that is, the majority are currently unmarried, which reflects a predominant migration pattern from the region. Young, unmarried male Egyptians enter the diaspora for economic or educational motives and marry only after successful labour migration or within the immigration context.

A similar consistency is visible in the regional distribution across Germany, which continues to follow the existing centre-periphery structure. The largest Egyptian populations are found in urban, structurally strong federal states such as Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia, Hamburg and Berlin (see Illustration 2).

This continuity is also apparent in a comparison over time of the ratio of permanent to temporary residence titles. Around 21% of Egyptians in Germany had a permanent residence title in 2014 and 47% had temporary residence permits, as shown in Table 3 and Illustration 3. In comparison with 2011, the numbers of successful applications for asylum have risen slightly (altogether 13% of the Egyptian population) with the BAMF

statistics reporting the various legal bases but not the reasons for seeking asylum (2015b, 2014).

The turning point marked by the 2011 and 2013 Egyptian revolutions and the post-revolutionary transformations can be assumed to have played a role here because the number of political prisoners from alternating camps has since increased; religious minorities such as Coptic Christians have been and continue to be exposed to increased discrimination and threats from terror attacks and street violence, so that applying for asylum in European countries has also become a realistic option for them (see BAMF 2015b, 2014, 2012).

The migratory pressure from the MENA region, and thus from Egypt to Europe, is tending to increase further (Zohry 2003, Zohry/ Harrel-Bond 2003, Zohry/ Debnath 2010, Fargues 2005a+b, BAMF 2015a) because the political upheavals

have not brought about the hoped-for changes to the long-term problems, and the instability in the economy and the political system is rather becoming permanent (Horst et al. 2013, Bouziane et al. 2013, El Masry 2013, Quaissa 2013). Nevertheless, Egyptians do not (yet) belong to the groups that are forced to flee en masse from civil war or persecution by the IS movement, such as Syrians in particular (BAMF 2015a), but are making their way to Europe on familiar routes[10] through formal and informal labour migration and educational migration.

The statistics of the German Federal Employment Agency provide a rough impression of what sectors of the German labour market attract Egyptian migrants (CIM 2011, cf. Table 4). The catering and services sector in the food and tourism industry as well as warehouse and construction work in urban logistics centres apparently provide opportunity for inclusion that enables entry to the German labour market without prior vocational qualifications (see Illustration 4). The fact is that migrants with no vocational qualifications form the second largest group of Egyptians subject to social security contributions in Germany after employees with university

degrees or vocational qualifications (CIM 2011; cf. Gesemann 1995:31-33). This circumstance is indicative of processes in which socio-economic underclasses are formed by migrant workers from Egypt that are otherwise hardly identifiable in the statistics.

Continuity remains in the integration of highly qualified Egyptian graduates into the German labour market in the fields of technology and engineering, human medicine, law, economics and social sciences.

This roughly corresponds with the choice of subjects among the 2,000 or so Egyptian students at German universities (figure from 2014, cf. CIM 2011, see Illustration 5): engineering followed by mathematics and natural sciences, linguistics and cultural studies, law, economics and social sciences, and human medicine and health sciences are among the most popular subjects. It can thus be presumed that Egyptian graduates expect this pathway to provide major opportunities for transforming their educational migration into labour migration to Germany.[11]

EGYPTIAN POPULATION IN EMPLOYMENT IN GERMANY				
	2014	in %	In 2011 for comparison	in %
Total Egyptian population	19,786	100	11,923	
Subject to social security contributions	4,422	22	2,999	25
Unemployed	1,309	6	986	8.3
Job-seekers (including unemployed)	2,590	13	N.A.	
Marginally employed	1,476	7.5	N.A.	

Table 4: Data from CIM (2011, updated through written notification in July 2015)

ACCESS TO NON-ACADEMIC OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS WITHOUT TRAINING (20.1% OF WORKERS SUBJECT TO SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS)		
Occupational groups	Without qualifications	With qualifications
Chefs	46	36
Waiters, publicans	36	61
Cleaners	58	N.A.
Office assistants/ workers	24	56
Warehouse and transport	59	41
Unskilled workers	92	N.A.
Vendors, wholesalers and retailers	25	33
Self-employed professionals	?	?

Illustration 4, prepared by C. Weißköppel on the basis of CIM (2011).

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10 Not to be underestimated are established transnational social networks with Germany (or across Europe, cf. Müller-Mahn 2005) which promote the dissemination of knowledge on national immigration laws, but also enable exploratory visits on tourist and visitor visas. It can therefore be assumed that Egyptians also combine a wide range of mobility and migration strategies (cf. Assal 2004, Weißköppel 2010) in order to realise their plans to migrate to Germany.

11 Provided the scholarships are not paid for by the Egyptian Government and thus not conditional on a return to Egypt.

That is consistent with the observation that the proportion of Egyptian emigrants with university degrees by far exceeds the share of graduates in the Egyptian population as a whole[12] (Zohry/ Harell-Bond 2003: 42,48; Zohry 2003:30-35, 60; see also World Bank 2011 a+b). In other words, those who have the socio-economic means in Egypt to attend a higher-level school and/or university often combine this with the further aim of educational or career mobility into Western countries where they frequently find more attractive salaries and better career opportunities (see also Zohry/ Debnath 2010, own research among Coptic educational migrants to the USA and Australia, unpublished).[13] This situation, however, also points to the methodological problems of the second and third generation, that is, the children of first-generation Egyptian migrants who are not registered by the German Federal Statistical Office as Egyptians, but as Germans if they have not decided against German citizenship before their 23rd birthday (BBMFI 2005b). Their biographies are determined to a high degree by the transnational space emerging between German and Egyptian society, which in the middle-class milieu often leads to professional careers in the sector of intercultural mediation work, politics or diplomacy, or in the German-Arab economic area. These actors should therefore potentially be included in the Egyptian diaspora in Germany even if they cannot be statistically captured under the criterion of Egyptian citizenship.

In summary, the rather fragmentary data on the socio-economic status of Egyptians in Germany (see also CIM 2011 and 2015), which urgently needs to be systematised in the long term and carefully differentiated, allows three segments of the Egyptian population to be identified:

1 University graduates in explicit graduate professions or in businesses of their own, as well as students who aim for these sectors after graduation;

| ACADEMIC EDUCATION AT GERMAN UNIVERSITIES		
Ranking	Subject	Number
	Egyptian students at German universities	1,991 (total)
1	Engineering	713
2	Mathematics and natural sciences	491
3	Linguistics and cultural studies	278
4	Law and economics	261
5	Medicine	139
6	Art	39
7	Agriculture	38
8	Sport	12
9	Other	3

Illustration 5, prepared by C. Weißköppel on the basis of CIM (2011 and 2015).

2 Employees who are subject to social security contributions and potentially have the status of employees in small, medium-sized and large enterprises as well as public institutions;

3 Unemployed and marginally employed workers seeking further or new jobs.

This socio-economic three-way split, however, provides little guidance on whether and how Egyptian migrants organise themselves in Germany along political, religious or ethno-national lines, that is, *in socio-cultural terms* in the broadest sense. Before addressing this socio-cultural localisation (see Part II), it is important to refer to the few sources that attempt to describe the history of the Egyptian diaspora in Germany (Gesemann 1995, Baraulina et al. 2006, cf. international: Zohry/ Debnath 2010, Zohry-Harrell-Bond 2003, Fargues 2005a+b).

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12 Accordingly, 53.9% of the international migrants have secondary school or university degrees while only 30.2% of the Egyptian population in the country of origin have these educational qualifications.

13 It is important to note at this point that international schools in particular (such as the German schools in Alexandria and Cairo) may become gateways to a transnational career in this regard because their graduates already possess a strong ability to connect with German and international universities and institutions, which makes them perfect candidates for a career at points of intersection of international economic or political cooperation.

I.II.II Historical dimension

It is interesting to highlight the long-standing practice of intellectual dialogue between Egypt and Germany which was characterised by close contacts between the two capital cities as early as the beginning of the 20th century, for instance through the visits of Egyptian intellectuals to Berlin, who sought further training on concepts of nationalism and thereby advanced decolonisation processes and the independence movement in their own country. A lively exchange between artists also took place at the time in the field of aesthetic culture such as film, literature and theatre, involving new technologies and skills (e.g. in the art of filmmaking) which were eventually imported to Egypt (Gesemann 1995:11).

In the period between the two world wars, efforts also emerged to advance the process of industrialisation and modernisation in Egypt (Ibrahim 1996:113), for example by importing spinning machines and weaving looms from Germany to intensify cotton production (see also Gesemann 1995:11). After World War Two the exportation of technology was intensified through the training of experts from Egypt in Germany for a limited period of time, for example in agricultural engineering.

This focus on promoting training represented a pull factor for migration to Germany which was even reinforced in the 1960s by the granting of scholarships, for example by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) for a degree course or doctoral studies for Egyptian students at German universities. Germany's tools for promoting university courses remain attractive for young Egyptians to this day. This explains why the group of Egyptian graduates continues to have a very strong presence in Germany (Riester 2011:278-279, Baraulina 2006: 13) and why they have a greater influence on developments within the diaspora organisations than the labour migrants (see below).[14]

At the same time, the then Federal Republic of Germany enshrined *German* language and cultural policy in the Arab region particularly through central institutions in Egypt. In addition to the renowned Goethe-Institut in Cairo, three German schools were transformed into bilateral state education projects under church sponsorship in Alexandria and in the capital and established as inter-confessional schools that can be attended by *all* Egyptians whose parents are able to pay the tuition fees. The bilingual education that can be obtained there is recognised in both Egypt and Germany. This form of transnational elite promotion is only a small building block, but in the long term it contributes greatly to building a positive image in Egypt of Germany as a location that promises successful career prospects.

It can thus be said that the Egyptian diaspora formation in Germany since the 20th century has not been a one-way street, but rather has been shaped by political, economic and cultural interests of both societies and developed in both directions.

Gesemann (1995:37f) addresses in great detail the religion-specific formations of the Egyptian diaspora in Germany, which are often mentioned merely as a peripheral criterion of description (cf. Baraulina et al. 2006:14, where this topic is treated in a footnote). Reflecting a religious 'duality' in the Egyptian society of origin (according to Abu-Lughod 2005, see also Hansen 2015),[15] Egyptians in the German diaspora have continued their Christian (Coptic-Orthodox) or Islamic confession since the 1960s/70s. However, Gesemann emphasises that the range of established religious identities and practices was already pluralistic in the 1980s and 1990s. Egyptians participated in both Coptic-Orthodox and Catholic and Protestant churches, and besides the predominantly Sunni groupings of Islam, there was an Egyptian-Sudanese Sufi brotherhood (see Klinkhammer 2005, Weißköppel 2005a) and participation in Islamic orthodoxy in the context of Salafist or Wahhabi groupings; and within these milieus there were more or less modern, liberal or rather more traditional and even fundamentalist positions.

This is where we transition to the current socio-cultural dynamics of the Egyptian diaspora in Germany because the interviewees in this study repeatedly brought up the communi-

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14 Conversely, it should not be concluded prematurely that the Egyptian population in Germany is composed primarily of educational migrants (see Riester 2011). Gesemann (1995) already pointed out that the various political crises in Egypt have always motivated people to embark on labour migration or seek political asylum in Europe and Germany. An urgent need for research exists in this regard in order to capture the various socio-economic segments of the Egyptian diaspora in Germany in a more differentiated manner.

15 The anthropologist Abu-Lughod (2005) uses this term to designate a key expression of ethno-cultural identity policy in Egypt which, although subordinated to the national identity, unfolds its impact in particular situations, for example in crises, see also Weißköppel (2013) and Hansen (2015).

cative demarcation between what are referred to as 'religious' and 'secular-liberal' Egyptians – an internal discourse of the actors that refers to sub-differentiations beyond the dominant, national-cultural attributions within the migration context (see Baumann 1996).[16]

I.II.III Socio-cultural dimensions

The demotic discourse on 'we' and 'the others': the 'secular-liberals' and the 'religious'

In the conversations held primarily with representatives of cultural associations that tend to regard themselves as 'secular-liberal' or 'neutral', reference was repeatedly made to 'the other', probably more religiously motivated, actors who organised them-selves separately and formed their own networks among 'religious' Egyptians, for instance through regular mosque attendance. Interestingly, this 'religiosity of the others' was hardly specified any further, attributes like 'Islamists' and 'fundamentalists' were avoided, and the most explicit reference was to the political proximity to the 'Muslim Brotherhood'. Moreover, no specific persons were recommended as interviewees. This is obviously a way of drawing a boundary between worlds of identity and life-worlds that marks different practices and discourses and, hence, worldviews and lifestyles among Egyptians in Germany and leads to reciprocal avoidance behaviours. Accordingly, this aspect of Egyptian diaspora formation in Germany has always been merely implied and hardly explicated in a more differentiated manner, at least not among the representatives of the 'secular-liberal' camp, where the majority of the interviewees were located.

Indications that a major portion of the Egyptian population in Germany is turning to networks revolving around the 'Muslim Brotherhood', and thus to the spectrum of political and even fundamentalist Islam, are not new (see Baraulina 2006:14). Gesemann (1995:39f) writes that the Egyptian Muslim Brothers have been present in Germany since the 1950s, having organised themselves in European exile because of their precarious position in the young nation state of Egypt and developed two Islamic centres in Germany.[17] They acted with the dual aim

of equipping Muslim migrants who had settled in the 'land of infidels' with the traditional, that is, righteous Islamic life-style (note from the author: and thus counteracting the trend towards westernisation and secularisation) while contributing to the implementation of Islamic political regimes in the countries of origin (anti-secular and post-secular regimes in the framework of an Islamic nationalism). Gesemann (1995: 40) concludes with the observation that reliable data on the organisational structure of the Muslim Brotherhood in Germany were not available for the simple reason that they were active in *several* mosque communities and could not be clearly assigned to any particular one. The observation made by many interviewees that they had met and were meeting 'in mosques'[18] in general, but that the continuous contact between the two 'camps' had therefore been lost, is therefore accurate as well.

From a researcher's point of view there is an urgent need for more in-depth research into this field of religious networking potential in the Egyptian diaspora[19] that goes *beyond* national affiliations and leads to dedicated, new formations, particularly in combination with language skills and socio-political positions[20]. Among others, these also include groupings of political Islam and Islamism[21], which remains very much reconnected to the countries of origin, as can be seen from the socio-political dynamics of Egypt's post-revolutionary phase which was also reflected in the German diaspora.

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16   Baumann (1996:109f) has coined the expression 'demotic discourses' in opposition to the dominant, potentially culturalising discourses in order to emphasise that criteria for identity construction other than ethnic and national criteria do in fact circulate among migrants and are of relevance.

17   Gesemann (1995) localised them in Aachen as well as in Munich, where Egyptians predominated. No current figures were available and it can be assumed that the networks have further transnationalised.

18   Mosque' must be understood in this context as a multifaceted 'contact zone' (Pratt 1986) used not only for religious practices but also for social, humanitarian and political activities and not tied to exclusive membership so long as those who go there avow themselves to the Muslim faith and follow the corresponding rules of conduct.

19   Although the author was at first ambitious to integrate religious networks, this was not possible within the timeframe of the present study. Processes of establishing contacts in particular require long-term ethnography, especially in political times characterised by state controls and potential mistrust towards Muslim communities.

20   This research should by no means be of interest only from a security policy perspective. Rather, studying religious communities with a high proportion of migrants should provide numerous insights regarding their self-help potential, activities in civil society and empowerment strategies in ethnically and nationally mixed groups (see Adogamé/ Weißköppel 2005; Lauser/ Weißköppel 2008).

21   Interestingly, the information from the Office for the Protection of the Constitution of the state of Lower Saxony (2015) relating to the Muslim Brotherhood in Germany contains very little about the Egyptian origin and is indeed a highly abbreviated portrayal.

Socio-political polarisation with respect to Egypt's new leading figures

The political development after the Egyptian revolution of 2011 (overthrow of Mubarak) up to June and August 2013 (overthrow of Mursi) is summed up as one that has accentuated the demarcation between secular-liberal and political-religious Muslims in the diaspora as well. During the first phase of the revolution that led to the overthrow of the Mubarak regime in February 2011, a national, patriotic euphoria was also widespread among Egyptians living in Germany, along with the view that the situation would not change unless everyone pulled together. The election of the Mursi government, that is, the growing power of the movement and party of the Muslim Brotherhood and its ensuing overthrow by renewed mass demonstrations, however, subsequently led to heightened tensions within the diaspora as well. Supporters and opponents of Mursi were facing off in associations and organisations, rendering constructive cooperation impossible at times. For many associations the only solution was to explicitly ban political debates, which is one of the reasons 'cultural' topics and events dominate the associations' agenda (see Part II Type A below). This post-revolutionary trend towards fragmentation affected not only the established associations, however, but also newly formed networks that initially brought together a broad range of Egyptians and German sympathisers (see below Part II, Type C). Here as well, the deposition of President Mursi caused a split in the movements which remains to this day and resurged as a response to the appointment of the current el-Sisi government.

When the visit of the Egyptian President to Germany was announced at the end of May 2015, the polarising dynamics among Egyptians in the diaspora could be heard again. While representatives of Berlin's cultural associations cancelled interviews because they were busy preparing for el-Sisi's visit, elsewhere flyers were distributed calling for demonstrations to protest against el-Sisi. Convoys of cars were paraded in major cities denouncing human rights violations under el-Sisi and portraying the new government as another military dictatorship. The incidents at the federal press conference of Chancellor Merkel and President el-Sisi, at the end of which an activist disguised as a journalist denounced the wave of death sen-

tences handed down by the el-Sisi government (Ruptly TV 4 June 2015) confirmed that the potential opponents of the new Egyptian Government had also mobilised their supporters.[22] In Berlin rival demonstrations erupted between diaspora groups who wanted to welcome el-Sisi respectfully and groups agitating against his hard-line policies. A third, smaller group of opponents and ex-revolutionaries was also present that abnegated any allegiance to a specific camp, emphasised the transitory condition of Egyptian society and continued to press for fundamental reforms in reference to the demands raised in the revolutions.

Results of the blog analysis

The attached content analysis of the three German-Egyptian blogs on the Internet confirms that the presidential visit to Germany was followed very closely and commented on by people who are closely or loosely associated with Egypt. The two most widely used blogs ('German Egyptian Organization' and 'Egyptian German Network for Changing Egypt') contained opposing positions on the current leadership style of President el-Sisi and diverging estimates of the impact it would have on the development of Egyptian society and its international relations. The entries mainly revolved around human rights issues, the way in which political opponents of all persuasions were dealt with in the period 2014/2015, what measures of government repression they were subjected to and how that divided Egyptian society. It thus became clear that el-Sisi's measures for internal security and stabilisation against fundamentalist and terrorist forces were also perceived with great ambivalence among the diaspora when they were used to again justify autocratic and antidemocratic positions that hamper or prevent reform processes for fundamental democratisation. Part of the written interactive discourse on the blogs continues to analyse the events in autumn 2013, when former president Mursi was deposed and replaced by an interim government that was again strongly influenced by the Egyptian military. This controversy revolves around a politically and legally legitimate understanding of democracy (importance of regular elections versus importance of demonstrating 'masses' of the population), but tends to always include support for and aversion to the ruling figure: previously President Mursi, today President el-Sisi. From the perspective of political science, it is interesting that the debate is

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22   It was argued whether opposing Egyptians from the broader European diaspora had joined and what actors from fundamentalist movements of the Turkish, Syrian and Yemeni diaspora wishing to express solidarity were among the demonstrators.

hardly ever about positions of individual parties or factions, but that the fixation on leading personalities is used to define the individual and collective position.[23]

For their part, interviewees from the secular-liberal camp commented that the events surrounding the visit of the president had revealed the 'much bigger' group of Egyptians in Germany,[24] who are referred to as the 'religious' ones who continued to sympathise with the Mursi government and the party of the Muslim Brotherhood.

In June 2015 as well, the central council of Egyptian associations in Germany published a press release on its website which provided an assessment of the events surrounding the 'Mursi overthrow' in 2013. This document sets out that the rejection of the Mursi government, including the party of the Muslim Brotherhood, mainly originated within the *demonstrating* Egyptian population. That prevented the advances of the IS

movement in Egypt, according to the perspective put forward in that document (Nokraschy/ Tharwat 2015). One of the most important representative bodies of Egyptian associations in Germany thus communicated loyalty to Egypt's current government in order to call for a strong, international alliance against Islamist, terrorist movements in the MENA region.

These observations in the research period of March to October 2015 illustrated how predominant the tendency of a commitment to support *or* oppose the changing leaders of the Egyptian state is in the diaspora, providing an impression of the social tensions which these political discussions have generated among Egyptians in Germany as well, and how this has led to new socio-political fragmentation between the respective actors and their forms of organisation.

It can thus be concluded that the Egyptian diaspora in Germany is by no means fully represented by the (rather secular) cultural associations. Allusions to a large number of 'religious' Egyptians, which were repeatedly made in the interviews, should be followed up more systematically in further research projects on the Egyptian diaspora. Needless to say, in addition to politicised Islamic or fundamentalist movements (cf. Office for the Protection of the Constitution of the state of Lower Saxony 2015), it is also necessary to study all religious groups, communities and institutions in which Egyptians are active as Muslims or Christians[25] or members of other faiths in Germany.

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23   The current developments following the parliamentary elections in Egypt in autumn of 2015 confirmed this trend. After some parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood were banned ahead of the elections, independent delegates now predominate who represent various camps of the political landscape but are unable to jeopardise the majority needed to support President el-Sisi (Völkl in an interview with the radio station deutschlandradio kultur, 10 January 2016).

24   The interviewees estimated the quantitative ratio of 'secular-liberals' to the 'religious' at between 10% to 90%, 20% to 80% and 33% to 66%. Others divided them into three camps: A.) the el-Sisi supporters and sympathisers, B.) the explicit Mursi opponents and sympathisers, and C.) the critics of both leading figures.

25   Gesemann (1995:37-39) appropriately outlines the establishment of the Coptic-Orthodox diaspora. The author's research on the Coptic diaspora in Europe (2008-2012) yields additional insights into how strong the influence of the centralist structure of the Coptic patriarchy in Cairo is on the diaspora communities including the Coptic bishops and priests. Networking activities are also of central importance in this regard. They take place within the German-language communities in Switzerland, Austria and Germany, but also include conferences and events that bring together the European Copts, e.g. the annual 'Youth mission', an international congregation of Coptic young people from across Europe organised by the organisation 'African Hope' e.V. (3).

Surprisingly, the discourse regarding the religious-political demarcation from the perspective of the secular-liberal Egyptians described above hardly makes any reference to the *inter-confessional* identification as Coptic Christians or Muslims, which may be of key importance in Egypt in order to stimulate national identity policy depending on interests and majority and minority dynamics (Abu-Lughod 2005, Jacobs 2010, Guirguis 2012, Weißköppel 2013, Hansen 2015). This demarcation is perhaps treated with caution in Germany because some office-holders in associations and in the umbrella organisation are Christians and their dedication to the cause of all Egyptians in Germany is highly appreciated. In German society, which is marked by religious pluralism and secularism, it is particularly the cultural associations that demonstrate how Egyptians participate in civil society regardless of their religious affiliation or other worldviews.

Preliminary analysis Part I

Overall, the interviews with selected representatives from established cultural associations confirmed the observation from the predecessor study (Baraulina et al. 2006) that the socio-cultural landscape of the Egyptian diaspora is strongly characterised by socio-economic status differentials. The reason the associations do not map them adequately is that they primarily represent an academic and economic elite[26] that shapes the work of forming a socio-cultural identity within German society (see Part II, Type A below). Such a dominance of well-established groupings or actors is not unusual in diasporas (see Töloliyan 1993), but it does distort the perspective of third-party descriptions (see Riester 2011, Zohry/Debnath 2010, Moursi 2012) if easy access to these groupings – enabled by their forms of representation and their level of academic education and, thus, their affinity to academic researchers – causes other relevant groupings to be neglected.

In this regard, the present study succeeded, despite scarce resources, to focus on the young next generation, as roughly half the interviewees represent the current first generation of educational migrants or second generation offspring (see Weißköppel 2007) who, although they grew up in Germany, often possess transnational mobility and cultural experience obtained through family visits or work assignments in Egypt. Accordingly, these newly emerging organisational forms were examined in greater depth (see Part II, Type C) also with a view to their potential for promoting development in Egypt.

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26 That caused Baraulina et al. (2006) to coin the term 'rotary effect', meaning that the primary objective of these cultural associations was to secure their own socio-economically high status, to present the first-generation migration project as a successful one and to pass these successes down to the following generations.

Mapping of socio-cultural organisation among Egyptians in Germany

A key analytical interest of the diaspora concept is the issue of social organisation 'forms' (Vertovec 2000:141) among migrants from a particular nation of origin or group within the immigration context. In accordance with the objective of this study, mapping was conducted in order to portray what types of organisation are selected for Egyptians' self-organisation in Germany and where these are localised geographically and socio-politically. Criteria that determine how people describe themselves and others, that is, to what extent they refer to the country of origin or other identity labels, play a central role here.

II.I Results of mapping

After reviewing existing GIZ data and further study undertaken during the period from February to July 2015, five types of organisations and networks in Germany were identified on the basis of the analysis:

Type A: Explicit Egyptian-German cultural associations that elevate national affiliation to the primary membership criterion.

Type A+: This type involves overarching structures through an umbrella organisation that connects the locally dispersed Egyptian clubs or associations at national level (across Germany in this case) and aspires to represent the interests of Egyptian immigrants both in Germany and to Egypt.

Type B: Overarching connections or associations based on other identity criteria than Egyptian citizenship, such as affiliation with the Arab or MENA region, which can be connected with religious or gender affiliation. Such a broader identity spectrum also covers younger activities of the second and third generation, that is, of children of Egyptian migrants. Given that a wave of business start-ups arose here particularly after the Egyptian revolution of 2011, a specific Type C of transnational networks can be identified.

Type C: These transnational networks and organisations are characterised primarily by cultural work in Germany as well as educational and development projects in Egypt and other Arab countries of origin. In this way they establish a transnational social and cultural 'space' which manifests itself, for example, through websites, forums and blogs, but also in the process of mainstreaming the associations across multiple locations.

Type D: Informal networks in the context of friendships, vocational groups, family and relatives that deliberately forgo a formal structure.

Type E: Explicitly humanitarian organisations in which Germans and Egyptians are active as members supporting or organising development projects in Egypt, among other activities.

In the following we characterise and contrastively profile the individual types of organisations as they were identified through the interviews with the official representatives of these organisations and networks and the information material made available. The interview number is stated as the source in brackets in order to ensure anonymity (see overview of interviews, Annex 2).

Type A. Explicitly Egyptian or Egyptian-German associations are established primarily in the western German federal states in cities and conurbations where the main contact persons and meeting points are located. The focus on western Germany is explained by the history of German-Egyptian relations which, as mentioned in Part I, were actualised by the then Federal Republic of Germany particularly in the

1950s/60s through development and educational support for Egyptians and German cultural policy in Egypt.[27] The first migrant population settled in West Berlin and in large western German cities such as Frankfurt am Main, Cologne, Stuttgart, Munich, Hamburg and Hanover, where good job opportunities existed. Today the picture has shifted only to a minor degree as a result of the increasing attractiveness of eastern German university cities such as Leipzig and Dresden, where Egyptian students have founded associations and overarching networks (see Type C).

In the founding phase of many associations at the beginning of the 1960s, pan-Arabic ideas were predominant, reflecting the debates in the country of origin so that migrants emphasised their Egyptian origins less than their affiliation with the Arab region in order to already realise in the diaspora the vision of a strong alliance among the Arab states with migrants from other Arab states such as Palestine, Syria and Lebanon. In the course of the political developments in the MENA region and in Egypt, particularly after the socialist-oriented Nasser government (1954-1970) and the peace negotiations with Israel in the 1970s under President Sadat (1970-1981), the pan-Arab idea was the subject of highly controversial debate, leading to divisions and dissolutions of many associations of this type. The 1970s thus marked the advent of new ethno-national associations as there was hope that association activities would be shaped by less contentious issues when embedded in the national context of affiliation with Egypt, and this assessment proved to be largely correct up to the revolutions of 2011 and 2013.

Today's Egyptian or German-Egyptian associations are mainly characterised by their work on building cultural identity (Hall 1994) in order to reflect on aspects of Egyptian identity/identities in the situation of migration and dispersion and to explicitly cultivate them in the association setting. These include celebrations in the context of secular and religious holidays from Egypt, the corresponding social gatherings with Egyptian and Arab food and drink, and the invitation of Egyptian musicians and belly dancers. These occasions are also used for members to invite German guests from among their own binational relatives, the neighbourhood or work colleagues.

In order to keep abreast of current events in Egypt and remain in touch with the country's history, they organise lectures and literature and film events, often with Egyptian presenters who occasionally travel from one club to another. The cultivation of the Arabic language, particularly the spoken Egyptian dialect, is practised by the first generation through their interaction while explicit language courses for the second generation or non-Egyptian spouses tend to be the exception. In the past, heads of associations were more likely to try to persuade local schools to introduce Arabic courses into their children's curriculum (5).

Associations currently focus on the political events in Egypt in the wake of the 2011 and 2013 revolutions.[28] After the initial euphoria that Egypt would become a democratic state, the discussions became polarised in the diaspora as well between the pro-Mursi and anti-Mursi currents, and presently between the pro-el-Sisi and anti-el-Sisi currents. In some associations this has already led to political topics being completely omitted from the agenda because they have a socially divisive effect when individual members come to be regarded as nothing more than sympathisers of or opponents to a political or even religious current. Cultural associations were said to be explicitly urged to maintain their independence from party politics and religious denominations in order to enable dialogue to continue. Today this function of a club for political debate is being performed more by German-Egyptian online discussion forums (see Annex 4), where technology allows completely different forms of individual distance and anonymity, thereby potentially mitigating the explosive social impact of controversial debates.[29]

None of the association representatives (2, 5, 8, 9, 14, 17, 24) mentioned any planned development support initiatives for Egypt – if at all, it was mainly individuals who became active because they were well resourced or had businesses of their own in Egypt (see Type D below). Associations are more active in displaying solidarity for newly arrived Egyptians in Germany or in supporting and counselling refugees. The assistance offered ranges from informal contacts, advice and financial support

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27 Despite the affinity of the Nasser government to socialist countries such as the GDR, the sources make no mention of any explicit cooperation with the former East Germany.

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28 Disagreement exists over whether the overthrow of Mursi can be regarded as a 'revolution', although more in interaction with the official media discourse in Germany, which some of the Egyptian interviewees criticise very sharply. They accuse the 'West' of failing to recognise that 20 million people had also demonstrated in the streets against President Mursi and demanded his resignation even though he had been elected democratically (see Nokraschy/Tharwat 2015).

29 This requires further investigation, e.g. by interviewing actors who interact both online and face-to-face.

(24) to explicit legal advice (17), social or pastoral care in refugee accommodation (6, 7), and accompanying people to state agencies and helping with translations (4, 14). The volunteers made it clear that the limits of volunteering were quickly reached, particularly since the unspoken rule that 'Arab brothers (author's note: and sisters) are required to help each other' was applied to the letter. Contacts with refugees were often established not through compatriots but arranged by the municipal commissioners for refugees and integration.

Occasionally members of associations are also active in municipal politics where they seek to represent the interests of migrants in general (8, 17).

With regard to structural difficulties, interviewees primarily mentioned difficulties in securing venues. Many associations cannot afford to rent rooms on a permanent basis, and municipal venues for migrants or multi-function rooms tend to be the exception. Their usual practice is therefore to book rooms in cafes or restaurants for each meeting, generally coupled with the requirement to purchase food and drink. In the summer they hold picnics and barbecues (24). Associations that regularly organise cultural events deplore the fact that project support usually does not include personnel costs, although these would be urgently needed in order to professionally manage project applications, financing, correspondence and other aspects.

All interviewees brought up the issue of generational change. Many associations are still headed by men from the first generation of migrants, many of whom are now over 70 years old, and they lack second-generation successors.[30] They see as a problem the fact that the young generation prefers different forms of networking, especially digital media (see Type C below). Associations in which a generational change took place on the board mentioned the predominance of the seniority principle in Egyptian society, which is also applied in the diaspora and requires seniors to be respected, including in decision-making.

For the sake of completeness, it should be added that in addition to the explicit 'cultural' associations there are further associations that define themselves through professional groups such as 'Egyptian entrepreneurs' and 'Egyptian doctors'. Since individual actors in particular determine the work of these associations and networks, they will be treated under Type D.

Type A+: Umbrella organisations as superstructure of regional Egyptian associations. A new development of the Egyptian association culture became visible when a first umbrella organisation, 'Das ägyptische Haus' *(The Egyptian House)*, was founded in Germany in 1982/83. Its self-declared objective was to better connect the locally dispersed associations in Germany, to coordinate their interests and represent them externally, both to the German Federal Government and to the Egyptian Government. The basic structure was confederative, encouraging all regional associations from the various federal states to become members if possible. The federal board was elected every two years and resided locally in one particular federal state. Its maximum term was to be four years, followed by a rotation of members and location. This rotational principle was undermined when the board of the 'Egyptian house' of 2007 to 2011 refused to step down even after this four-year term. According to the current chairperson of the new umbrella organisation, the 'Zentralrat ägyptischer Vereine Deutschlands', a conflict emerged when seven member associations decided in 2012 to leave 'the Egyptian House' and form a new umbrella organisation.[31] This 'Central Council of Egyptian Associations in Germany' is currently composed of 15 member associations which have a joint website; the executive and supervisory board has a supra-regional composition and is currently located in the state of Hesse. The main task of this umbrella organisation is to connect the Egyptian associations in Germany, to supply them with overarching, up-to-date information (e.g. about the activities taking place in other associations and federal states) and to represent the – organised – Egyptian diaspora both internationally and nationally. Such an overarching association of Egyptian diaspora organisations also exists at European level. Its members are interconnected and send representatives to regular meetings with the Egyptian Government in order to represent the perspectives and interests of Egyptian emigrants (dostor.org 2015).

This more recent development of the Egyptian government more actively managing the relationship with expatriates can also be observed in the formation of a 'Scientific Advisory Council' by the incumbent President el-Sisi (Ahram online 2014). This advisory council includes five Egyptians from Germany who are renowned experts in science and economics

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30   The statistics (German Federal Statistical Office 2015c) show that there is no shortage of 'younger' actors, as the average age of the Egyptian population in Germany is indicated as 32 to 33 years.

31   The previous umbrella organisation was thus relieved of its function, but continues to exist as an association.

and is tasked with advising the President on key aspects of transformation policy in Egypt. The contents of this work so far are not public, but its focus can be expected to be placed on drafting recommendations on educational policy, energy and construction policy and on organising the state media (Ahram online 2014).

The interviews with two of these advisors highlighted how much this new office enhances their prestige both in their society of origin and in the German immigrant society,[32] since they gain insight into a number of macro and micro dimensions of current policy-making in Egypt. It remains to be seen whether this dynamic will also have repercussions for local associations, for instance by encouraging a certain lobbyism among the members which could result in political positioning in favour of or against the el-Sisi government. In general, however, it also enables new information flows between the country of origin and the organised diaspora in Germany that render more transparent which sectors and skills are sought after for current development promotion in Egypt. GIZ's idea of promoting short-term visits for knowledge transfer by diaspora actors (under the Migration for Development programme) could be integrated here as well by, among other activities, making use of the advisors' internal knowledge as mediators to determine which actors of associations might be considered for which development projects.

Preliminary analysis of Types A and A+:

The interviews with office-holders generally demonstrated that the culturally oriented associations possess rather little potential for initiating and implementing development cooperation projects in Egypt. The focus of their work is on socio-cultural identity and integration work in the migration context and, thus, on embedding migrants into civil society at municipal level in Germany. In this regard individual members develop a humanitarian and political commitment to helping newly arrived Egyptians and refugees from the Arab region in Germany. However, the cultural associations maintain and energise the bond with the culture of origin on a very intense emotional and social level, which has become evident in the upheavals since 2011 and constitutes an important prerequisite for developing socio-political involvement with the concerns of present-day Egypt.[33] Structural (geographic, personal and temporal) hurdles as well as the ageing membership profile must be noted as well, since many associations ask themselves whether and in what way they can continue to be managed by the following generations or newly arrived migrants (see Part I.2 above).

What is striking is the potential of individual members who take on leadership roles in which they develop leadership qualities in the long term that may also be of relevance in (volunteer-based) development cooperation. Consideration should be given to the provision of specific training offers for these leadership figures by GIZ.

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32 Reference should be made here to the potential 'multiple incorporation' in status systems both in the country of origin and in the host society, as established by Nieswand (2007).

33 The results of the content analysis of the blogs also attest to how closely Egyptians in the diaspora follow, comment on and debate the political events in their country of origin.

Type B: Overarching networks and organisations.

In addition to associations that carry the Egyptian origin of their members in their name, a number of organisations exist in which Egyptians are active or were founding members (2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 22) that rely on overarching networking criteria. These are predominantly associations that declare Arabic as a common language, but also as a common cultural space and ethnic and geographic region of origin and are therefore open to members not only from Egypt, but also from all Arabic-speaking and Muslim-dominated countries of North Africa and the Middle East. These are civil society groups organised around human rights work, women's emancipation our other socio-political debates, for instance on the aspect of how Islam is dealt with in the host country Germany; still others address the objective of Arab-European dialogue, that is, the intention of making contact between people from (Western) European countries and individuals from the MENA region. This type of organisation illustrates that many actors regard other criteria than the national (original) identity as relevant, either because they are familiar to them from their original contexts (e.g. religious affiliation), or because they are useful in the migration context as they generate networking potential. This applies specifically to Arabic language skills, as they enable migrants from small diaspora populations, for example, to connect with other Arabic speakers and their activities on a much broader basis.

1. Arabischer Frauenbund ('Arab Women's League')

An informative example of this is the Arab Women's League in a northern German city, which was founded by an Egyptian woman (13). It united women who had come to Germany as marriage migrants and share experience of integration crises. These women sought social venues for exchange with other migrants outside family and/or work in order to shape their new life situation in Germany. In cooperation with a civil society sponsor, they succeeded in establishing regular meeting points for Arabic-speaking female migrants which have become hubs for mutual self-help where they support each other in learning the German language and share their impressions of German day-to-day culture and social, cultural and political life in their towns. While this initiative has given rise to networks among Egyptian women, female refugees from the MENA region are increasingly entering this circle who are being supported by more experienced women in settling in in German society, with offers for children or presentations on different topics. As they are sensitised to gender-segregated spaces from their society of origin, they are less concerned with general emancipation from

men or patriarchal structures,[34] but more with the practice of having spaces for women in the host society that lead to diverse groups of interest among local women and/or female migrants and motivate them to participate at political level.

Asked about problematic situations in Egypt, specifically female predicaments tend to be dismissed and the focus is generally shifted to the impoverished population, e.g. the situation of street children who can no longer be adequately cared for by their families. The members of this Arab Women's League were positively surprised to learn that GIZ has programmes aimed at supporting projects in their countries of origin. Their current understanding is that association work and volunteering in Germany should apply only to public life and forms of local integration, so the perspective on their society of origin was new to them. That showed how important it is for information about the GIZ programmes to be disseminated among a broad circle of recipients in the migration context.

2. OMRAS e.V.

An association that operates along different lines is OMRAS e.V., which has dedicated itself to human rights work in the Arab region since the 1990s and specialises in legal advice and support for refugees from countries of the MENA region. After a long period of stagnation for lack of members to do the work, a young Egyptian who was studying in Germany was approached with the request to rejuvenate the board. However, it was not until the revolutionary processes in Egypt and other countries of the MENA region were underway that he decided, along with a handful of other activists, to revitalise the association. This story is an example that illustrates something that is true of many other actors in recent association work: it often requires a triggering moment for latent ideas and plans to be put into action. In this regard, the events of the 'Arabellion' since January 2011 were a collective, identity-forming turning point, particularly for the young generation and the children of first-generation Egyptian immigrants (cf. Mannheim 1964, Weißköppel 2007), because they were suddenly in a position to draw concrete comparisons between the current political events and their original identities and wanted to articulate them in a broader public sphere within the German immigration context. The general interest in the revolutions quickly gave them access to potential alliance partners, contemporaries and people

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34 A widespread misunderstanding between Western gender activists and experiences of female Arab-Muslim migrants who are accustomed to gender segregation and women's culture in day-to-day life from which they derive a self-confidence that tends to be foreign to Western women.

who shared their political preferences, both from the diaspora communities and from mainstream society. In the first phase this was expressed in spontaneous solidarity demonstrations for Egypt and then successively led to information and public relations work and more specific projects.

In order to characterise this historical and political turning point as a visible generational dynamic in the Egyptian diaspora as well, it is fair to refer to transnational networks as a specific type of organisation which emerged in the year 2011 and thereafter.

Type C. Transnational networks and projects.

These networks tend to combine motives of types A and B with the motive of including explicit references to the country of origin in their own identity work and, in the process, addressing affiliations other than national ones, such as Islamic or transnational affiliations, that is, cultural hybrid identities (10, 11, 12). What characterises these 'new' forms of organisation most of all since their establishment are activities in support of the regions of origin combined with the aim of promoting a greater and critical flow of information in the host countries about the events in the MENA region (2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 26). These are often educational activities designed to counteract islamophobic or racist movements against 'Muslims' or 'Arabs' and organising cultural transfer in the field of fine arts and culture between Germany and the countries of origin.

These networks articulate themselves strongly through the Internet, or through individuals appealing for social connections, which can translate into local or formalised networking in the formation of associations only at later points in time.[35] The members are mostly young actors with a high level of education and skill in new media, similarly as in their countries of origin. By way of example, two of these organisations, Mayadin e.V. and Gusour e.V. are presented below with their projects:

1. Gusour e.V.: Organisation of an Arab film and cultural festival

Founded by Egyptian students, this association dates back to networking activities at the University of Applied Sciences and the University of Bremen which commenced in 2008. The degree course of Arabic and Economic Studies ('Wirtschaftsarabistik') brings both German students learning Arabic and Arabic-speaking and international students together, which has supported intercultural dialogue between both groups from the

outset. Initiatives of the university's International Office have created national communities since 2011, including among Egyptian students, so that existing informal cross-networking has been further institutionalised. Alongside other joint events such as the organisation of celebrations (e.g. 'Arabic Night' or 'Sugar Festival' at the end of the fasting month of Ramadan), workshops for Egyptian Arabic or joint visits to sports events (e.g. an international karate championship featuring the favoured contender, the Egyptian national team), the Arabic film evenings became especially popular as they transported knowledge and views about specific life worlds and problems in the MENA countries. Many of the German subtitles had to be produced by the initiator itself. However, this bilingual approach also increasingly succeeded in drawing German-language viewers to the films, which eventually led to the organisation of a first public festival in 2012 that addressed the upheavals in the Arab world. In cooperation with a municipal cinema and the Protestant students' community, the third Arab film and cultural festival 'Aflamna' was organised in 2015; it had connections to other venues in Lower Saxony and Hamburg. The film festival was also accompanied by an 'Arab cultural week' which offered a broad range of events and workshops on the topic of 'migration and integration'. Using own funds and with the help of a few sponsors, international presenters as well as filmmakers and directors from Egypt were invited to discuss their productions with the German audience. Films included current releases such as 'Cairo Exit' (2011) or 'Jews of Egypt' (2013, 2014), which are censored in Egypt and may only be screened abroad.

The extraordinary volunteer work undertaken by the organisers to arrange such a supra-regional film and cultural festival with an event programme that stretched across two months with a minimal budget can be explained primarily by the strong desire to use film to convey contemporary (but also historic) realities of the societies of origin in Germany. The motives are diverse and include the desire to be closer to the home country through this medium, the urge to report about the various problems within the immigration context and the wish to create an awareness that goes beyond stereotypical images of 'the Arabs' or 'the Muslims'. At the same time, the organisers want to enable debate and controversy from exile, as it were, about films that are taboo in Egypt or subject to strict control. Screening these films in the diaspora thus creates a transnational social and discursive space that informs actors of civil society and lets them participate in current developments in the MENA region. It is important to note that this setting enables a key

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35   But the reverse can also be true, where local networking creates a supra-regional presence in which the Internet is used as an excellent medium for communication and representation.

transfer of knowledge between the country of origin and the host country that contributes to educational processes in the 'North-South'/'South-North' relationship in the broadest sense, since these programmes and events also greatly benefit German students who may later be working as development and cultural experts in the MENA region.

This trend of making cultural productions from the Arab region (film, art, literature, theatre) into mobile carriers of transcultural knowledge and experience can also be found in other networks and organisations of this transnational type. Further activities also include projects involving educational work in the countries of origin, such as workshops on the current understanding of democracy in Egypt (e.g. Liqa e.V.) or educational support for marginalised children and young people in the poor quarters of Cairo. The activities of the Mayadin e.V. association set the trend in this regard.

2. Transnational project organisation by Mayadin e.V.

Mayadin El Tahrir emerged as a loose network resulting from spontaneous demonstrations during the 2011 revolution, particularly in Berlin. While Egyptian migrants from all walks of life ('from dishwasher to millionaire', 10) were present to express their solidarity with the demonstrators in Cairo, a fragmentation gradually set in, especially after the election of President Mursi and the dominance of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian government. It resulted in two groups: 'Together for Egypt', actors who defined themselves to a great extent by their affiliation with Islam and associated the revolutionary upheavals with long-term ideas, including new visions for implementing a political Islam;[36] and Mayadin El Tahrir, an initially loose network of young first and second generation Egyptians who were mainly from the academic milieu and adhered to rather secular, left-wing political ideas but initially wanted to carry the revolutionary spirit into the German populace, especially by inviting transnationally active artists (filmmakers, singers, graffiti and photo exhibitions, see above Gusour e.V.). This also explains the reference in its name to 'Tahrir Square' in Cairo, which has become an icon of freedom of assembly and organised resistance across a diversity of population groups in Egypt. Its cultural and public relations work (panel debates, film evenings; combination of academic

lectures and cultural events) generated teams with specific functions among the approximately 50 members and, eventually, association structures. These were helpful for cooperating effectively with other organisations of civil society (e.g. 'House of Democracy' or 'Workshop of Cultures'), for example in order to share office rooms or event spaces or submit project applications for cultural support.

The transnational idea of wanting to pursue specific political and long-term education projects in Egypt is said to have existed from the beginning. The finding of the revolutions that many people demanded democracy but had little knowledge of democratic culture and little experience with it, the formation of parties and political participation, especially in the educationally disadvantaged groups of Egyptian society,[37] gave rise to initial activities such as visits to suburbs and rural regions by bus and the exchange of basic knowledge on democracy (such as the right to vote) with the local population as creative and playful approaches to enabling broad contact with them. The opportunity eventually arose through a member of the association to acquire an attic in a multi-storey rental building in Cairo and turn it into a public library and meeting point for the neighbourhood. Crowdfunding and project support through the CIM 'Migration for Development' programme enabled the association to renovate the rooms and, in particular, stock them with books. The target groups are children, young people and women in the district, with the aim being to create access to knowledge for a (more) democratic society that is as neutral as possible, which in the Egyptian context means non-religious. Initial experience shows that the approach should be politically as neutral as possible, since the formation of political camps has been omnipresent since the revolutions of 2011 and 2013 and there is immediate apprehension over recruitment attempts, which may prevent parents from allowing their children to enter the library. Since then, the association has only referred to the metaphor of the square, Mayadin (without the addition El Tahrir), to emphasise that this project provides a space for education in every respect (e.g. for environmental awareness and the management of resources) and should be used for open-ended educational and exchange processes among the visitors. The 'environmental attic' is managed by two local staff and supported by sporadic visits of project managers from Germany.

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36 This group still exists and is organised in the context of an Islamic cultural centre. However, contact with them could not be established.

37 Harders (2013, i.a.) has long conducted research on this topic and shows from a differentiated perspective how women in Cairo's suburbs, for example, organise themselves and participate in politics.

What is particularly plausible in this project construction is its transnational character, which is realised not only at staff level but in its content, communication and finances. The cultural and public relations activities conducted in Germany both advertise the project in Cairo and serve to raise funds. The website reports on current developments in the 'environmental attic' as well as on other relevant themes in Egypt and Germany. Further decentralised educational centres of this kind, or 'Mayadins', which are intended to create spaces for creative thinking and action not just in Egyptian society, are planned for the future.

Preliminary analysis of Type C: from a classic cultural association to a transnational educational network

Both Type C organisations presented here as examples show what potential exists particularly within the young generation of Egyptians in Germany for making connections to their country of origin, highlighting specific links and implementing them

in projects. Nevertheless, the actors clearly articulated that they reached the limits of their volunteering capacities when events and projects become more comprehensive and complex. That is when staff and financial support are lacking because project applications, accounts settlement etc. also require particular induction and knowledge of bureaucracy, and websites and other PR material and correspondence must be maintained and updated. In such intensive phases of project management, social conflicts often emerge among the members, not least as a result of lack of resources.

Adding to the challenge of transnational action – which was mentioned in a number of interviews (1, 10, 15, 21)   is the fact that the transfer of funds to Egypt is very difficult or can only be done through informal channels and requires cooperation with local NGOs. Influence through funds from abroad is to be prevented as a requirement of the Egyptian state but also as an expression of the post-colonial self-image of individual actors.

In general, these transnational activities and projects are key starting points for GIZ to tap into new niches or fields of development cooperation in the sense of reciprocal, global learning between emigration and immigration countries. Accordingly, more information should be disseminated among these young actors about support opportunities, and experienced actors should be identified who can be approached as experts in knowledge and project transfer. In this regard, further best practice examples of CIM and GIZ projects should be outlined which could be systematically introduced into GIZ's advisory and information-provision work.

It is biographically relevant that the majority of the actors are second and third generation migrants who became active in their post-adolescent phase, that is, between the ages of 20 and 30, when they no longer perceive their original identities as a stigma (e.g. through the reference 'with a migration background') but productively build them into their own personality, that is, discover them as a special resource, e.g. in the form of hyphenated identities confidently introduced as 'German-Egyptians' (Weißköppel 2011). In the second and third generation, life plans tend to emerge that differ from those of the parental generation and strongly focus on securing their own emigration as a successful project (Weißköppel 2007). Interestingly, the revolutionary events in particular were used by many second-generation immigrants in Germany as points of reference for transforming latent feelings of affiliation with the Arab region or Egyptian society into explicit affiliation and participation and, eventually, into concrete action for the region of origin. Winning these actors over for long-term development cooperation may potentially become more promising than exclusively focusing on cooperation with the relatively well-established older members from the first migrant generation.

Thus, it is worthwhile considering new support formats that could combine volunteering and professional education in development cooperation for these young actors.

Type D: Loose, informal networks of individuals.

The exploratory work has illustrated that many Egyptians are known within the relevant private networks who do not belong to any association or organisation. Such **individual actors** certainly remain important nevertheless (3, 19, 21, 23), as some of them operate restaurants and bistros that are used as informal meeting places by other Egyptians such as families and friends in Germany. It is also known that there are persons who successfully work in businesses or as doctors or lecturers at universities and were therefore recommended as important contact persons for the study. That is also why they are regarded as interlocutors for specific problem situations of Egyptians in the diaspora. This was confirmed by an interview with three **entrepreneurs** (nos. 21/23) who pointed out that the repatriation of bodies to Egypt, for example, not only incurred high transport costs but also required approval for which informal pathways of mutual help and financial support are often taken. Criticism of formalisms and hierarchies within the cultural associations was expressed here (see above Type A), which deterred many from joining. All three were therefore only loosely connected with each other and had only sporadic contact, if any, with associations and mosque communities.

Successful entrepreneurs (23) with international locations in Germany, Egypt and the wider Arab world stated that they were following political and economic developments in Egypt very closely in order to assess whether it was worthwhile to invest further in their country of origin. All interviewees stressed that Egypt had a shortage of skilled workers which made it so difficult to hire suitable local personnel at the Egyptian locations. They affirmed that the training support which German institutions gave during the Mubarak regime went in the right direction and should be resumed. They almost implored how important it was for the security situation in Egypt to stabilise again and for measures aimed at controlling corruption and Islamist terror to take hold before the diplomatic relations between Germany and the ruling el-Sisi regime could improve so as to clear the way for resuming bilateral cooperation. They generally emphasised how strong the willingness was to do business in the country of origin once the political conditions had improved.

Interviews with individual members of the **German-Egyptian association of doctors** (28, 29) brought to light specific ideas on how to intervene in the Egyptian health sector. They include setting up and expanding further infrastructure for in-patient healthcare in urban and rural regions, and interest in initiating more foundation research in Egypt and systematically recording regionally specific disease patterns that could then be treated more effectively. Individual projects were implemented in the regions of Luxor and Aswan (southern Egypt) and in Alexandria (northern Egypt) between 2006 and 2008. All of them involved Egyptian-German teams of doctors who contributed to modernising the health system with specific technical aid supplies and medical services. The activities of this German-Egyptian association of doctors are therefore also assigned to Type E – humanitarian organisations –, which are outlined in the next section.

Type E. Explicitly humanitarian organisations.

Besides the loose networks of actors from various social groups, some of whom also work as individual patrons for small humanitarian projects in Egypt or even for individual fates of migrants in Germany (see above 21, 23), another type of organisation exists in which Egyptian migrants are active or among the founding members (1, 4, 7, 22). They operate in non-governmental organisations explicitly dedicated to setting up and supporting humanitarian work and development projects in Egypt. This specific work for Egypt, however, is usually embedded in a further context demarcated by the geographic region or continent of 'Africa'. It makes use of the very general

interest of the German public in promoting development in Africa partly with the aim of inducing a certain willingness to make donations for the initiated projects. However, it also aims to involve German and other actors of civil society as members and contributors. In the **Afrika-Freundeskreis e.V.** ('Friends of Africa', 1) it is primarily former students of an Egyptian professor in Germany who devote time within the association to several small projects in Kenya, Tanzania, Sudan and Egypt which serve primarily to combat local structural poverty. Some of the mostly German members have developed personal links stemming from student excursions or research projects in the project regions, with a focus on supporting projects in rural Egypt. At the same time, it is precisely the German members who have the necessary public relations skills and competence in filing applications with official agencies, which pose greater challenges for some of the Egyptian migrants.

The members of **African Hope e.V.** (4), who work on key issues such as education, health care, resource conservation and use of alternative energies in a variety of regions in Africa, with a recent focus on East and Central Africa, have a similar approach (see also 7). Their link to Egypt is not immediately obvious but becomes apparent when one learns that the second line of the association's work, the annual hosting of what is known as the 'Youth Mission', is an activity of the European Coptic-Orthodox churches which receives personnel and financial support from African Hope e.V. It is therefore unclear to what extent the other development cooperation projects are influenced by confessional motives. It may be a hybrid type of humanitarian and religious organisation common in the Christian humanitarian spectrum of non-governmental organisations (such as 'Bread for the World').

In this regard, the present study has shed light on the largest Islamic humanitarian relief organisation in Germany, **Islamic Relief e.V.** (22), whose co-founder and current managing director is an Egyptian migrant. The organisation was founded in Germany in the 1990s along the lines of a precursor organisation in England because it was recognised that until that time few opportunities existed for many Muslim emigrants to perform the Islamic charitable duty of donating to the needy, the

'Zakat', or even to make one-off donations known as 'Sadaqah' in the country of origin. The annual Zakat is typically donated during or towards the end of the fasting month of Ramadan so that needy people in the neighbourhood, community or village can take part in the break of fasting with abundant meals. The interviews with other Egyptian Muslims confirmed that migrants often send their Zakat al-Fitr to their own relatives in Egypt, either directly through travelling family members or by bank transfer. A growing number of Muslims now tend to perform these religious rituals and charities through online donations such as the ones offered by Islamic Relief e.V. Its website explains all institutionalised forms of Muslim charity (from Zakat and Kaffara to Sadaqah to Qurban, the animal sacrifice in observation of Eid al-Kabir). Accordingly, individually tailored donations are offered ranging from minimum to maximum amounts. The offers are clearly linked with the destination countries and corresponding projects so that the donor can decide for whom or for what the donation is intended. As part of the Sacrifice Feast, the Qurban donation is even converted to the number of sheep to be slaughtered (or to the quantity of meat for the recipients) and transferred in accordance with local market prices.

This professionally designed online offer illustrates a *religiously* motivated willingness to donate which is being increasingly used by successful migrants in welfare states in order to combine their religious obligations with links to their country of origin.[38] However, it also demonstrates that a culturally, that is, religiously specific practice of charity is being pursued that was learned in the society of origin and is institutionalised through socialisation in Islam. In this regard, it was of interest to know whether projects in Egypt are a focal area of the work of Islamic Relief Germany. The range of offers presented on the website contained no explicit projects. One interviewee reported that a project for persons with disabilities was developed over several years in Cairo-Heluan but had to be suspended recently because of difficult diplomatic relations with the Egyptian Government.[39] This is further indication that the concrete cooperation

38 Fischer (2015) reported in his analysis of Germans' willingness to donate that Islamic Relief is one of the most successful online charity organisations, among other reasons because it appeals to donors with a migration background.

39 The reason for this is presumably the political proximity of Islamic Relief to the Muslim Brotherhood movement, which caused the current Egyptian Government to ban or hamper outside support for projects in Egypt.

between international non-governmental organisations and local partners in Egypt often faces political obstacles that are sometimes caused by bureaucracy and sometimes by state control over the content of the promoted projects (see above Type C).

This link between humanitarian and religiously motivated action (see Clarke/ Tittensor 2014) by diaspora actors, which is particularly apparent in Type E organisations, should generally be explored more closely because it is here that familiar charity patterns stemming from the culture of origin combine with current projects aimed at promoting development in the society of origin, potentially generating further constructive ideas. This ties up with the above recommendation of exploring in greater detail the religious groupings in the Egyptian diaspora and their activities with a view to humanitarian action.

Part III
Conclusions and recommendations

Within the limits of the methodological framework, the present study was able to show the developments of the Egyptian diaspora in Germany since 2005 following on from the precursor study (Baraulina et al. 2006).

While socio-structural continuities predominate in the demographic development of the Egyptian population in Germany (Part I), Egyptian associations show mainly socio-political dynamics since the political upheavals in the country of origin beginning in 2011 (Part I. 3 and Part II).

These dynamics manifest themselves, on the one hand, in accounts of fragmentations and the formation of camps within the Egyptian diaspora around the relevant leadership figures of the various Egyptian transitional governments since March 2011. This shows how closely the events in Egypt are being followed by actors in the diaspora and how they shape their own positioning. The research into the current Egyptian associations in Germany showed that a number of new organisations were founded since the events of 2011 that are characterised by younger actors and transnational action strategies. The study thus fulfilled its objective of exploring the generational dynamic in the Egyptian diaspora and pointing out recent developments in the associa¬tion landscape. The study also yielded significant research desiderata that should be addressed first.

General research desiderata on the Egyptian diaspora in Germany

1 In order to be able to make more informed statements about the historical depth of the settlement of Egyptians in Germany, it would be desirable to conduct more detailed research on the history of contacts between German and Egyptian institutions. For example, it should be examined what population groups or target groups in Egypt were motivated to emigrate to Germany and what mobility cycles were thus initiated. That would allow the specific configuration of the Egyptian diaspora in Germany, where both educational migration and labour migration predominate, to be reconstructed more accurately, potentially making more transparent which interests in the bilateral relations between the two countries have contributed to the specific formation of the Egyptian diaspora in Germany.

2 Historical sources are currently incomplete, so the question of socio-cultural fragmentation into more 'religiously motivated' and 'secular-liberal' networks and institutions can hardly be answered, although the phenomenon has been observed since the 1980s (Gesemann 1995) and has also been confirmed as a relevant demarcation in the current study. In order to extend the current focus beyond the secular-liberal cultural associations, comprehensive ethnographic research is necessary that traces the history of the more 'religious' networks and explores their current importance in a differentiated manner. This includes not just the Muslim networks, but also the various Christian denominations in addition to the Coptic-Orthodox diaspora communities in German-speaking countries. With a view to the objectives of the GIZ 'Migration for Development' programme, it is of particular interest what forms of humanitarian and developmental activities are developed by migrants in religious organisations and what opportunities for cooperation exist. So long as such foundation research has not yet been conducted, we recommend that GIZ should make better use of *religious* organisation platforms of the Egyptian diaspora as spaces for making contact and disseminating information.

3 The study yielded a further gap in research with regard to how the paths of integration of non-academic migrants from Egypt are realised. Because of the well-documented data on educational and academic migration, research has so far tended to insufficiently address in what other occupations Egyptian immigrants who migrate *without* vocational or with *non-academic* qualifications (CIM 2011) establish themselves in Germany and what strategies for training they then develop. As these migrants tend to be underrepresented in the cultural associations, more findings would be necessary as to whether and how they could be approached for the component of 'returning experts' within the 'Migration for Development' programme, considering, for example, the great need for tradespeople and specialists in small and medium-sized businesses in Egypt.

4 The present study on the Egyptian diaspora has generally illustrated the dynamics that can be observed just ten years after the previous study, which justifies the need for more continuity and methodology in researching migrant diasporas in Germany. Assuming that German development institutions have an interest in closer cooperation, regular research can also be seen as a vehicle that enables contact to be maintained on a continuous basis, which can only encourage mutual trust and the sharing of information.

From here we can proceed to making specific recommendations for GIZ. As set out in Chapter II, the current landscape of Egyptian diaspora organisations can be broken down into five types (A - E), each of which offers different starting points for further work by GIZ in the context of the various components of the 'Migration for Development' programme.

### Type A. Egyptian-German cultural associations:

The findings of the study suggest that this type of organisation could be used for systematic information and public relations work in order to draw their attention to the programmes of GIZ. In particular, an effort should be made to win over the leaders of the associations, particularly the board members, as facilitators for the 'Migration for Development' programme. If cultural associations have an interest in such development projects, it is usually individual, dedicated members who develop ideas and then mobilise appropriate support in terms of resources or individuals within their networks. These individuals, who are often well-resourced or already possess professional qualifications, can be accessed easily through the associations. Further steps to be considered are supplementary lectures and training imparted by GIZ for these interested parties in order to present ongoing best practice examples from the programmes and introduce them to the specifics of project application. Given the current age structure of the cultural associations, the main interlocutors will be older migrants who are highly motivated to take part in short-term visits under a programme still to be developed for senior experts.

Type B. Overarching networks:

The study deliberately included associations and networks that do not define themselves by original national identity but through other identity features or interests. These are, in particular, *Arabic-language* alliances that bring together migrants from the MENA region. Depending on their objectives, they then tend to consist of women or men, political or religious networks seeking to establish cross-links with other Arabic-speaking individuals. Here the recommendation is that these forms of networks should also be specifically approached by GIZ through information and PR measures because they involve active Egyptians who are often the initiators of these associations. At the same time, the information on programmes can be spread more broadly among diverse national diasporas from the MENA region through this channel. Some actors, for example, were not aware that projects aimed at supporting their country of origin can even be recognised and supported as a task of association work in Germany.

Type C. The new networks that emerged after the upheavals of 2011

make this regional and transnational motive for networking within the diaspora even more obvious because they bring together many second and third generation actors who connect with young first generation migrants. As the work of these networks, which is often directed at cultural policy, aims to change awareness both in the migrant societies and in the original and transformation societies, the GIZ programmes should as a matter of principle provide for the fact that knowledge and skills today circulate across national boundaries and thus can generate diverse development impetus. With a particular view to supporting these younger networks in their efforts to promote *educational and cultural work in the countries of origin,* including in the current phase in which the post-2011 euphoria is waning, GIZ should enable short-term visits by individuals working in the field of culture and educational specialists from among the still young, transnationally active members. The individual analyses of projects and initiatives demonstrated how strongly political and general *educational work is regarded as a key development task,* for instance in Egypt's educationally disadvantaged population. Here GIZ can draw on its experience with other partner countries in how poverty alleviation can be meaningfully combined with educational work. Accordingly, the tenders for the 'Migration for Development' programme should also create thematic incentives for attracting a whole range of professional skills on the part of diaspora actors that go beyond technical knowledge transfer, as this intervention requires creative pedagogical and participatory skills, for example, in the areas of social work and cultural work in urban districts combined with new media.

We emphasise again that these more recent transnational activities should be treated as key starting points for GIZ to tap into new niches and innovative fields of development cooperation in terms of reciprocal, global learning between emigration and immigration countries. Accordingly, more information should be disseminated among these young actors about support opportunities, and experienced actors should be identified who can be further trained as experts in knowledge and project transfer.

Type D. It will be difficult for GIZ to approach the less formally organised actors

of the Egyptian diaspora, so it is all the more important to maintain contact with regionally well connected and active associations that also have an impact on the social environment of the broader diaspora. Numerous associations, as well as professional associations such as the German-Egyptian association of doctors, are

sustained by the dedication of individuals who are predestined for collaboration with GIZ in order to explore initial project ideas and plan them with a sense of realism for local implementation in the country of origin. With regard to this type, the recommendation of the precursor study from 2006 should be followed, namely that of setting up a decentralised information hub for project advice provision, perhaps at municipal offices for development promotion. In addition, professional associations are, of course, important points of contact for the programme component 'Returning Experts' in order to identify potentially suitable and interested persons.

Type E. The explicitly humanitarian organisations, which are initiated by Egyptians in the diaspora but usually operate in close collaboration with other actors of civil society, offer a number of examples of how development projects can be successfully implemented in the country of origin and what strategies of fundraising and donations can be mobilised in the migration context in order to better resource projects in Egypt. These actors could be more effectively approached by GIZ as *experts for unsalaried development cooperation* in order to include them in the further development of the 'Migration for Development' programme and to appoint them as experts for new applicants with GIZ and CIM. However, these humanitarian associations are particularly clear evidence that steps are being taken towards professionalisation which,

while they contribute to success, do not always lie within the radius of ordinary association work. Therefore, to conclude, the following section presents overarching demands that were formulated by actors of all five types of organisation.

Overarching demands

Interviewees who have already gained experience with applications to GIZ or other support institutions pointed out the structural obstacles of red tape involved in applica-tions for support. First, they regarded everything as very time-consuming, including project implementation and accounting, activities that relied on volunteer work. They therefore underscored the need for support formats to provide items for professional staff costs through which this structural obstacle in particular could be mitigated. Second, they would like the application deadlines to be flexible and processing times to be as short as possible. Association work is characterised to a great extent by spontane¬ous activities, which can be dampened by lengthy bureaucratic processes. Another topic that repeatedly emerged in the interviews was the search for physical venues in which the association could do its work. In this regard, GIZ is not the right actor to approach, but it should be communicated to higher agencies for integration that more public space should be made available for migrant activities. Some municipalities already have models for sharing such spaces cooperatively with other groups, but they are far from sufficient.

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
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
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